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WILLS-VALIDITY oF CoNDITION AcAINST CoNTEST-CoNTEsT BY MINoR-

Defendant, a minor, contested his mother's will which provided that if a beneficiary should make any effort to invalidate or alter the will, the provisions made
for such person should be void. Defendant's father, who had.been appointed
guardian ad litem, filed notice of contest and petitioned the probate court that
the general guardian be compelled to contest the will. After hearing, it was so
ordered, and a will contest was held in the circuit court, in which mental incompetency and undue influence were alleged. The contest being unsuccessful, the will
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was admitted to probate. Plaintiff, as executrix and beneficiary, unsuccessfully
sought a decree that she was entitled to the entire estate, on the ground that
defendant, the only other beneficiary, had disqualified himself to take by contesting the will. On appeal, held, affirmed. The condition against contest was void
against a minor as tending to deprive the probate court of its duty to protect the
interests of minors. Farrv. Whitefield, (Mich.1948) 33 N.W. (2d) 791.
There is a paucity of decisions bearing on the question of the effect of an infant
beneficiary's contesting a will in the face of a no-contest provision.1 The Michigan
court appears to have followed the reasoning of the New York court in Bryant v.
Thompson,2 where, on facts strikingly similar, the same result was reached.3 The
Bryant decision was criticized in a later New York decision,4 and a contrary result
was reached in another jurisdiction. 5 There is a division of authority in this
country regarding the validity of no-contest provisions; one line of decisions
strictly enforces the forfeiture provision in the event of contest;6 another recognizes an exception to the strict rule and does not enforce the forfeiture provision
if there is a showing of probable cause.7 While the strict view does carry out the
apparent intent of the testator, lead to uniformity in the law and reduce litigation,
the liberal view precludes the possibility, in the case of fraud or undue influence,
that the person perpetrating the fraud or unduly influencing the testator may
benefit by his wrongdoing. If it is possible to unduly influence the testator in
making his bequests, the same influence may result in the inclusion of a forfeiture
provision. Furthermore, difficulty of proving the necessary elements means that
not all justifiable contests succeed,8 and fear of forfeiture may prevent the contest
1 The Property Restatement specifically declined to take a position on this question because of the lack of sufficient authority and clearly applicable analogies. 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §428f (1944).
2 59 Hun (N.Y.) 545, 14 N.Y.S. 28 (1891), alFd 128 N.Y. 426, 28 N.E. 522 (1891).
8 The court refused to enforce a forfeiture where the contest was by the guardian ad litem
of an infant legatee. The ground principally relied on was that a contrary result would
deprive the court of its right and duty to protect the rights of the infant. See Boughton v.
Boughton, 2 Ves. Sen. 12, 28 Eng. Rep. 8 (1750), where on similar facts it was ruled that
the infant heir must wait and make his election to contest on coming of age.
4 In Re Kathan's Will, (Sur.) 141 N.Y.S. 705 (1913).
5 Moorman v. Louisville Trust Co., 181 Ky. 30, 203 S.W. 856 (1918); see Perry v.
Rogers, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 594, 114 S.W. 897 (1908), where the gift to the infant was
forfeited by the act of other beneficiaries in making a contest. The Bryant and Moorman
cases are criticized by Browder, ''Testamentary Conditions against Contest," 36 Mica. L.
REv. 1066 at 1102 (1938).
6 Donegan v. Wade, 70 Ala. 501 (1881); Smithsonian Institute v. Meech, 169 U.S. 398,
18 S.Ct. 396 (1898); Estate of Miller, 156 Cal. 119, 103 P. 842 (1909); Rudd v. Searles, 262
Mass. 490, 160 N.E. 882 (1928); Schifferv. Brenton, 247 Mich. 512, 226 N.W. 253 (1929);
In re Estate of Chambers, 322 Mo. 1086, 18 S.W. (2d) 30 (1929).
7 In re Friend's Estate, 209 Pa. 442, 58 A. 853 (1904); Rouse v. Branch, 91 S.C. 111,
74 S.E. 133 (1912); South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John, 92 Conn. 168, 101 A. 961
(1917); Tate v. Camp, 147 Tenn. 137, 245 S.W. 839 (1922); Will of Keenan, 188 Wis.
163, 205 N.W. 1001 (1925); Dutterer v. Logan, 103 W.Va. 216, 137 S.E. 1 (1927).
8 See Goddard, "Forfeiture Conditions in Wills as Penalty for Contesting Probate," 81
UNIV. PA. L. REv. 267 at 282 (1933).
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altogether.9 In the instant case it is likely that there was probable cause, since the
probate court determined, after adequate hearings, that the will should be contested. By the same token, the litigation cannot be considered vexatious, and
avoidance of vexatious suits is frequently the reason that the testator includes the
no-contest provision in his will. 10 There is a tendency for courts adhering to the
strict view to change to the liberal view when a case arises where a good faith
contestant has proceeded with probable cause.11 Although Michigan has been
committed to the strict view since the decision Schiffer v. Brenton,12 the court has
had no occasion to rule on a contest where there was probable cause since that
decision was handed down. The principal case represents such an opportunity,
but the Michigan Supreme Court prefers to find an exception to the general rule
of the Schiffer case, on the ground that public policy opposes enforcement of a
forfeiture clause against a minor. As a result it may be expected that, although
the Michigan court will continue to follow the strict view, other exceptions will be
created in the future in hard cases where manifest injustice would otherwise be
done.
·
Roland E. Ginsberg

9 3 PAGE, WILLS 818 (1941).
10 8 ALABAMA LAWYER 144 at 151 (1947).
11 In re Estate of Cocklin, 236 Iowa 98, 17

N.W. (2d) 129 (1945), specifically overruling Moran v. Moran, 144 Iowa 451, 123 N.W. 202 (1909); Moskowitz v. Federman, 72
Ohio App. 149, 51 N.E. (2d) 48 (1943) [dictum indicating the strict view early announced
in Bradford v. Bradford, 19 Ohio St. 546 (1869), may not be followed in the future]; Tate v.
Camp, 147' Tenn. 137, 245 S.W. 839 (1922), [where the good faith exception was added
to the earlier pronouncement in Thompson v. Gaut, 82 Tenn. 310 (1884)]. The California
court has retreated from the strict view rendered in Estate of Hite, 155 Cal. 436, 101 P. 443
(1909), by strictly construing the provision against contest. See In re Estate of Bergland, 180
Cal. 629, 182 P. 277 (1919); Lobb v. Brown, 208.Cal. 476, 281 P. 1010 (1929); 33 lowA
L. REv. 686 (1948).
12 247 Mich. 512, 226 N;W. 253 (1929), 28 MicH. L. REv. 356 (1930).

